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Abstract
In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, non-repressive 
institutional pillars in non-democratic governance are often neglected. Through 
the research on the People's Republic of China's two rounds of reinstitution-
alization in natural disaster management, a life or death issue for all Chinese 
dynastic regimes, this article aims to make contributions to new institutionalist 
studies of authoritarianism that help to explain the Chinese Communist Party's 
'authoritarian resilience'. Based on analysis of the evolution of China's thematic 
disaster response plans and disaster management mechanisms in the reform 
period, the article discusses different institutional imperatives or fundamental 
challenges the authoritarian institutional designers needed to address before 
and after the 2008 Sichuan earthquakeand to what extent the institutionalization 
and reinstitutionalization have been effective in addressing these challenges.1
Keywords: authoritarianism, citizen activism, disaster management, institutionaliza-
tion, participation 
Introduction
With its vast territory and diverse climatic and geological conditions, 
China is vulnerable to frequent natural disasters, which today affect 
about 300 million people every year. Since the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) seized power in 1949, the authoritarian Party-state has been 
trying to improve the effectiveness of disaster management by modern-
izing relevant bureaucratic organizations and establishing standardized 
norms and guidelines to direct such work, which is vital for the survival 
of the communist regime. Despite the importance the CCP has attached 
to disaster management, much of the early research on institutions in 
authoritarian regimes has neglected such non-repressive institutional 
pillars in the non-democratic governance of contemporary China, with 
the exception of a few studies (Chen 2012: 130-148; Lim 2011: 11-20; Tan, 
Hwang and Wang 2011; Yi et al. 2012: 295-309). The majority of these 
researchers has noticed a distinctive change in the bureaucratic struc-
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FIGURE 1: Annual death toll of natural disasters in China (2006-2012)
Source: Press Release from China's Ministry of Civil Affairs, 3 May 2013  
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as intra-regime tensions emerged during the rescue and reconstruction 
process following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. In response to some of 
these challenges, the authoritarian government reorganized the disaster 
management system, writing a variety of new norms and guidelines in 
new national preplans and provisions. The reinstitution, albeit admin-
istratively efﬁcient in coordinating various intra-bureaucracy players 
to achieve a better division of work, failed to address the urgent civic 
demand for substantial participation and supervision. The increasingly 
salient inﬂuence of the Internet and social media was overlooked by 
the institutional designers. Such neglect subsequently had an enormous 
ture and norms concerning disaster management after the Tangshan 
earthquake in 1976, which happened the same year the Mao era ended. 
However, very little research has been done to follow closely the recent 
effort made by the party-state to reinstitute national disaster manage-
ment in the hope of integrating the increasingly fragmented bureaucracy 
and reining in citizen activism in the age of the Internet and social media 
(Yang 2009). By improving the bureaucratic structure, accepting foreign 
aid and enhancing ﬁnancial and technical preparation, the Chinese gov-
ernment has done fairly well in controlling annual disaster death tolls to 
under 10,000 in most years (Figure 1). However, new problems such as 
growing civic activism and supervision facilitated by online media as well 
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negative impact on the credibility of the government-dominated disaster 
management system in the second Sichuan earthquake, in 2013.  
The study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, which takes 
seriously previously neglected institutional pillars of non-democratic 
governance, was revived when new institutionalist studies of authori-
tarianism shifted their focus to institutions of representation and division 
of power that people tend to associate with liberal-democrat regimes 
(Schedler 2009). Traditional institutionalism focused on institutions 
of repression and manipulation that were distinctively authoritarian, 
such as the Party state and secret police. In contrast, new institutionalist 
research on authoritarianism is keen to look at institutions of representa-
tion and division of power, such as federalism and legalism, as well as 
discussing under what circumstances non-repressive sectors might be 
repressive. Current scholarship has touched upon many aspects of the 
CCP's reinstitutionalization endeavour for adaptation and co-optation 
purposes, which includes the professionalization of the civil service 
(Brødsgaard 2002), rebuilding of Party cells (Pieke 2009), experiment-
ing with 'intra-party democracy' (Li 2009; Zheng 2012) and regular 
career cadre training in Party Schools (Shambaugh 2008). However, the 
Party-state's repackaging of disaster management institutions as well 
as its effectiveness in maintaining the CCP's 'authoritarian resilience' 
(Heilmann and Perry 2011; Nathan 2003: 6-17; Shambaugh 2012: 8-22; 
Wang and Tan 2013: 199) in the face of bureaucratic fragmentation and 
citizen activism is a ﬁeld still to be ploughed.2 In the shadow of the Arab 
Spring that has toppled a string of entrenched dictatorships in North 
Africa, the CCP's central authority has been facing unprecedented chal-
lenges from societal forces and vested interests within the regime in 
the realm of disaster management. Its credibility and legitimacy have 
been overtly damaged by scandals involving the use of donations and 
shoddy construction projects. In Huntington's (1968) classic formulation, 
maintaining political order in changing societies requires maintaining a 
balance between the capacity of elite state institutions and the volume 
of mass political mobilization. There has been signiﬁcant divergence 
among China specialists over the future of the CCP. Hence the study of 
the relationship between institutionalization and participation, which 
was argued by Winckler (1984: 483) as the most important domestic 
relationship in shaping the political transition of authoritarian regimes, 
in the realm of China's disaster management will shed light on the CCP's 
ability to co-opt citizen activism and adapt to an increasingly decentral-
ized and fragmented bureaucratic landscape. 
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In the ﬁrst three decades after the start of reform, remarkable economic 
growth and the effective governance limiting the devastating impact of 
natural calamities have legitimized the CCP's rule and absorbed most 
citizens' contentious energies. From 1978 to 2008, the Party-state proved 
adept in adapting political institutions to absorb and selectively repress 
civic activism and intra-elite tensions. Nevertheless, a watershed came 
when the eventful year of 2008 witnessed the Sichuan earthquake, the 
Beijing Olympics, the global ﬁnancial crisis and the burgeoning of social 
media. Based on analysis of the evolution of China's thematic disaster re-
sponse plans and disaster management mechanisms in the reform period, 
this article discusses different institutional imperatives or fundamental 
challenges the authoritarian institutional designers needed to address 
before and after 2008 in disaster managementand to what extent the in-
stitutionalization or reinstitutionalization has been effective in addressing 
these challenges. The article tries to ﬁnd clues on whether once-successful 
institutions built by the CCP in the contemporary authoritarian regime are 
still adept at containing mass demand for participation. A methodology 
employing the neo-institutionalist approach in accounting for the CCP's 
authoritarian resilience is adopted here, with the formal institutional 
evolution of China's natural disaster management system3 as a case in 
point to test the general applicability of the resilient authoritarianism 
perspective to China. Beneﬁting from a rich institutionalist literature in 
examining institutional complementarity among different agencies and 
between central and local governments (Hall and Soskice 2001), in sepa-
rately accounting for efﬁciency, effectiveness and legitimacy of institutions 
(Krasner 1983; Greif 2006), or in accounting for institutional change (North 
1990; Aoki 2001), the research intentionally selects the often-neglected yet 
important topic of natural disaster management to expand knowledge 
about the institutional pillars that support such resilience and also the 
limitation of institutional ﬂexibility. The article is designed to enrich the 
authoritarian resilience theory that attributes CCP's resiliency mostly to 
remarkable economic achievement (Wang and Tan 2013), 'inner-party 
democracy' or social management (Wang and Huang 2013).  
Institutionalization of Natural Disaster Management in 
China  
In history, the Chinese people's ﬁght against natural calamities has been 
never-ending, with major imperial regimes able to formalize systematic 
institutions to manage natural disasters. Historians have called such 
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disaster and famine-relief governance in ancient China 'famine politics' 
(huangzheng) (Dong South-Song-Dynasty (1127-1279); Deng 1937; Meng 
1999), which included policies, practices, institutions and even theories 
related to preparedness, relief and recovery in the disaster management 
cycle. Yet despite the intense attention paid to natural disasters, Chi-
na's imperial dynasties failed to establish an independent department 
specialized in disaster management. 
After the Republic of China (ROC) took power from the monarch 
of the Qing Dynasty and set up its government in 1912, modernized 
institutions managing natural disasters were introduced, with special 
departments appointed to take charge of relevant affairs. In August 1912, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (nei wu bu) was set up inside the ROC 
Beijing government to take charge of disaster relief work, philanthropy 
and public health, with its subordinate department of civil affairs taking 
over the detailed disaster alleviation work (Sun 2004: 55). In May 1921, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs publicized a statute to institutionalize a 
national committee on disaster management, which aimed to ﬁnd the 
causal factors behind natural disasters and work out corresponding 
preparation and prevention plans (Gong 1996: 500-504). During the ROC 
period, China was in the early stages of industrialization and moderni-
zation, which facilitated the introduction of modern-style bureaucracy 
to manage natural disasters. However, since the ROC's nation-building 
process was often disrupted by large-scale wars and severe political 
confrontation, the distracted bureaucracy failed to function properly 
to address major natural disasters.
After the CCP won a civil war and founded the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949, the new regime in its early days continued to au-
thorize the Ministry of Internal Affairs (nei wu bu) to be responsible for 
disaster relief work. In February 1950, a central committee on disaster 
relief (zhongyang jiuzai weiyuanhui) was established to coordinate disas-
ter management work among the various ministries (Internal Affairs, 
Finance, Agriculture, Water Resources and Health) and other related 
ministries and governmental departments. Vice Premier Dong Biwu was 
the head of the committee. Following the central government's edict, 
local governments subsequently set up their disaster relief committees 
at the prefecture, county and township levels. During the frenetic Great 
Leap Forward movement in 1958, the central committee on disaster relief 
and many of its local branches were abolished amidst people's blind 
faith that natural disasters would no longer pose a serious threat in the 
communistic China. In 1969, two years after the start of the Cultural 
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Revolution (1966-1976), the Ministry of Internal Affairs was abolished 
and most of its disaster management functions were scattered among 
other ministries and departments, which led to inefﬁciency and even 
chaos in this area. 
In the reform era, the PRC has gradually normalized the bureaucratic 
system in charge of natural disaster management once disrupted by the 
anarchical Cultural Revolution. In 1978, two years after the Cultural 
Revolution was over, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (min zheng bu) was 
re-established to resume some disaster management functions. During 
most of the 1980s, the Ministry of Civil Affairs was in charge of disaster 
relief only in rural areas, while the State Economic Commission (SEC) 
has the power to coordinate all the disaster management work at the 
national level. In 1988, when the SEC was abolished in another round 
of administrative reform, that responsibility was shifted to the State 
Planning Commission, which later transferred this function to the State 
Economic and Trade Commission established in 1993. In 1998, accord-
ing to a circular issued by the State Council General Ofﬁce, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission ofﬁcially handed over the function 
of organizing and coordinating disaster relief work to the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs,4 which since then has institutionalized its pivotal role in 
managing natural disasters in China.
In 1989, in response to the United Nations resolution to designate 
the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR), the Chinese government founded the National Commission 
for the International Decade on Natural Disaster Reduction, which 
was comprised of more than 30 ministries and commissions, including 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Foreign Ministry, the State Planning 
Commission and relevant military agencies and social groups. It soon 
became the top-level decision-making panel to command and coordi-
nate disaster relief work scattered throughout different ministries and 
departments. In 2000, as soon as the IDNDR was over, it was renamed 
the China Commission for International Disaster Reduction, which 
turned out to be a regular interagency coordination body under the 
State Council rather than an interim organization in answer to the call 
from the United Nations. In January of 2005, it was renamed the China 
National Committee for Disaster Reduction (NCDR). Headed by a vice 
premier of the State Council, the NCDR is responsible for studying and 
formulating principles, policies and plans for disaster reduction, coor-
dinating major disaster activities, giving guidance to local governments 
in their disaster reduction work and promoting international exchanges 
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and cooperation.5 Since then, the Chinese government has formalized 
the NCDR as the top interagency mechanism in charge of disaster 
management, with the Ministry of Civil Affairs taking on routine jobs 
of the NCDR and playing a pivotal role in coordinating work done by 
various ministries and sectors.
According to the division of responsibilities under the current disas-
ter management bureaucracy, the Ministry of Civil Affairs deals with 
most of the daily administrative work of the NCDR. It also coordinates 
disaster relief work among various departments, collects and releases 
the latest disaster situation information, manages and distributes the aid 
fund and materials from the central government, cooperates with other 
departments in relocating disaster-hit people, prepares the national level 
food and rescue material reservation, organizes public donations and un-
dertakes international cooperation in this area.6 The Ministry of Finance 
formulates the yearly budget for national disaster relief, supervises the 
use of such funds and provides special funds for severe disasters. The 
State Administration of Taxation formulates and implements the tax 
waiver policy in disaster-hit regions. The Ministry of Agriculture is in 
charge of the provision of agricultural materials such as fertilizers and 
diesel in the disaster-hit regions and helps peasants produce grains in 
the recovery phase. The Ministry of Water Resources plays a vital role in 
ﬁghting major ﬂoods and droughts and thus undertakes the administra-
tive work of the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, 
another interagency mechanism to cope with severe ﬂoods and droughts. 
The Ministry of Health is in charge of medical services in disaster-hit 
regions, while the Ministry of Transport repairs the roads and railways 
damaged in natural disasters. The China Earthquake Administration 
forecasts and monitors earthquakes, while the China Meteorological 
Administration takes charge of weather forecasts and releases warnings 
on meteorological disasters. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has 
established ad hoc leading panels on combating ﬂoods and droughts 
and earthquake relief.
During the reform period, in which the PRC has been paying more 
attention to the institutionalization and legalization of government 
activities, the country has enacted more than 30 laws and regulations 
related to disaster management. These include the PRC Flood Control 
Law, the Law on Earthquake Preparedness and Disaster Reduction, 
the Emergency Response Law, the Regulation on Forest Fire Control 
and the Regulation on the Participation of Armed Forces in Emergency 
and Disaster Rescue Actions. The Chinese government has enacted de-
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tailed regulations on comprehensive disaster relief work, the reporting 
and monitoring of disaster situations, the management and use of aid 
materials and funds as well as on receiving international and domestic 
donations. Under the related laws and regulations, the Chinese govern-
ment has institutionalized an emergency response system comprising 
the National Master Plan for Responding to Public Emergencies, ﬁve 
national thematic disaster response plans and emergency response plans 
for 15 central government departments and their detailed implementa-
tion plans and operation norms (United Nations Economic and Social 
Council 2008: 9). Compared to the PRC's early experiences in disaster 
management, the bureaucratic system in the reform period, facilitated 
by all these laws, regulations and plans, has clariﬁed the assignment of 
duties among major departments. It has also standardized the proce-
dures through which the government, the armed forces, businesses and 
civil society plan for and reduce the impact of disasters, react during 
and immediately following a disasterand take steps to recover after 
the disaster. 
Evaluation of Institutionalization in Disaster 
Management: Norms and Operational Mode 
The Party-state's normalization and institutionalization of the bureau-
cratic system overseeing natural disaster management have profound 
political implications in coordinating intractable central–local relations 
(Zheng 2007) and improving the regime's international image and 
legitimacy. Since local governments in China had no power to raise 
revenue and most of their expenditures were disbursed by the central 
government in a strict top-down system prior to 1980, the central gov-
ernment had to be responsible for allocating relief funds to localities 
where natural disasters had occurred. In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
local governments gradually assumed control of their own revenue 
and expenditure under a contractual ﬁscal system characterized by 
deﬁning a ﬁxed sum paid to or received from the central government 
(Lin 2000: 477-490; Loo and Chow 2006: 215-216). Nevertheless, most 
disaster relief funds still came from the central government. From 
1983 to 1994, 85 per cent of the disaster relief funds used in Anhui 
Province were allocated by the central government, while only about 
15 per cent came from the provincial and county-level governments 
(Sun 2004: 192). In 1994, China introduced the Tax Sharing System 
allowing local governments to share tax revenues with the central 
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government (Chung 1995: 2-3; Loo and Chow 2006: 216). Thereafter, 
local governments at all levels also started to disburse more for disaster 
management. Local governments today shoulder about 30 per cent 
of China's total ﬁscal expenditure on disaster management, which is 
much higher than in the pre-1994 period. Yet they are still being pres-
sured to pay more for disaster relief to ease the ﬁscal burden upon the 
central government.   
Shifting from its insular attitudes towards foreign aid for disaster 
relief during the Cold War, China has been readily receiving interna-
tional donations through different channels in the reform period. In 
the early 1980s, the reformist leadership decided to accept foreign aid 
and opened its disaster relief system to the outside, with the United 
Nations as its major institutional channel to engage the world. The year 
1989 was a turning point, when China joined the International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) initiated by the UNand set 
up the National Commission for the IDNDR, which later became the 
top-level decision-making panel on national disaster relief work. As 
the predecessor of the National Committee for Disaster Reduction, the 
National Commission for the IDNDR in the 1990s had learnt a lot of 
modernized norms and practices in the ﬁeld of disaster management 
through international exchanges and activities. The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the government-
organized Red Cross Society of China and China Charity Federation 
are now the major sectors involved in receiving overseas aid and 
donations. In natural calamities like the 2008 Sichuan earthquake 
that have claimed huge casualties and economic losses, the Chinese 
government not only accepted international aid and donations, but 
also welcomed rescue and medical teams from foreign countries to 
the disaster-hit regions. 
Before the reform period, the PRC government had regarded the death 
tolls in natural disasters as state secrets and refused to release them to 
the public. Foreign media were not allowed to cover the disaster relief 
work on the spot at that time. As a move to greater transparency, in 
2005 China announced it would no longer treat the death toll in natural 
disasters as a state secret. The National Administration of State Secrets 
declared the declassiﬁcation of disaster-related death tolls at almost the 
same time.7 During the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, the country's worst 
natural disaster in the reform period, ofﬁcial media provided round-the-
clock coverage of the earthquake and the rescue efforts, demonstrating 
remarkable openness.
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In sharp contrast to the opaque and seclusive disaster relief work in 
the Maoist era, China's gradual openness to international aid and media 
coverage has won international praise from organizations like the United 
Nations (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2008) as well 
as domestic supportand thus consolidated the authoritarian regime's 
legitimacy that had been severely damaged by the Cultural Revolution 
and Tiananmen (June 4th) crackdown. 
As in many other parts of the world, China today has been making 
disaster mitigation and preparedness a priority task at policy, institu-
tional and operational levels. By accepting well-established international 
norms to guide the country's disaster relief work, the Chinese govern-
ment has managed to keep the casualties caused by natural disasters 
at relatively low levels. In the disaster management cycle, pre-disaster 
mitigation and preparedness activities not only reduce the probability 
that a disaster will occur and the negative effects of unavoidable disas-
ters, but also produce greater efﬁciency in responding to any emergency. 
Therefore, compared with the post-disaster phases of response and 
recovery, the preventive and preparation measures are more cost-ef-
fective and thus deserve intensive policy attention.     
Among all the preventative measures, building up ﬂood control 
facilities and related warning/forecasting systems has drawn the most 
attention from the Chinese government, especially since the Yangtze 
River ﬂoods in 1998, the heaviest in the reform period, led to a series of 
collapsed levees and killed more than 4,150 people. In the early stage of 
the reform period, the state followed a blatantly urban-biased develop-
ment strategy with most resources diverted to glamorous industrial and 
urban projects instead of water conservancy and forestation projects. 
As a result, China has to bear with the inestimable environmental costs 
of soil erosion and deforestation that exacerbated the ﬂoods (Figure 2 
shows that areas affected by ﬂoods had been on the rise from 1978 to 
1998). Since 1998, however, substantial funds have been generated from 
both central and local governments for the reinforcement of the levees 
and for building ﬂood storage and detention basins. China has invested 
heavily in the world's largest ﬂood control project, the Three Gorges 
dam completed in 2006. The government has also set up nationwide 
early-warning networks to monitor and identify risks and threats of 
meteorological, oceanic, geological, earthquake and forest ﬁre disas-
ters. Inﬂuenced by the government's enhanced pre-disaster prevention 
thereafter and favourable climate conditions, from 1998 to 2008, the total 
area affected by ﬂoods in China was greatly reduced (Figure 2). Since 
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2008, however, the numbers have surged, which could be explained by 
increased extreme weather in the context of climate change and local 
nonfeasance in maintaining water conservancy facilities.
With respect to preparedness measures, the Chinese government has 
not only mapped out national emergency response plans for major types 
of natural disasters, but also has built up a three-tiered manpower mo-
bilization mechanism that includes professional teams, volunteers and 
community-based human resources to respond to disasters. In addition, 
the Chinese government has established special ﬁnancial budgets for 
the response to and relief of general disasters and several central and 
local government departments, including civil affairs, water resources, 
agriculture and forestry, have established a system for stocking disaster 
relief materials. This system consists of ten central government stocks 
and local stocks in areas where disasters happen frequently (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 2008: 14).
The PRC has frequently mobilized troops to combat disasters such as 
ﬂoods, earthquakes, snowstorms and forest ﬁres. Now with 2.3 million 
soldiers, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been institutionalized 
as the country's most important rescue team in major disaster relief 
campaigns. According to the PRC Law on National Defence enacted 
in 1997, military personnel on active duty shall 'accomplish the tasks 
of dealing with emergencies and providing disaster relief'.8 During a 
rare snowstorm that affected much of southern and central China in 
early 2008, 306,000 PLA soldiers plus 1.07 million militia and army 
reservists were mobilized in the disaster relief effort.9 Within hours of 
FIGURE 2: Areas Affected by Floods in China (1,000 hectares)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009: 479)
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the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, thousands of soldiers and police were 
being deployed, with military helicopters heading for the epicentre to 
help with rescue efforts. Within three days, tens of thousands of troops 
were racing to the region to pull people from the rubble.  
China today is much better equipped technologically than before to 
deal with natural catastrophes, with improved high-tech systems for 
forecasting and monitoring disasters. Since the effectiveness of disaster 
management relies greatly on the utilization of related technology and 
information, the country has made a strenuous effort to improve its 
knowledge and technological capacity in all ﬁelds related to disaster 
mitigation. Relying on meteorological, oceanic and land resources, 
satellites as well as ordinary aeroplanes and unmanned planes, China 
has been using remote sensing and satellite positioning technology for 
surveillance tasks. Within two hours of the Sichuan earthquake, a map 
indicating basic information about the epicentre and major affected 
areas had been prepared by the National Disaster Reduction Centre, 
an information-sharing platform under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
In the following days, 120 maps and reports derived from satellite and 
aeroplane images were submitted by the Centre and its cooperative 
partners. Manned and unmanned aeroplanes equipped with remote 
sensors ﬂew over the areas hit by the quake to collect ﬁeld information 
with a view to more effectively deploying rescue and mitigation forces 
and relocating affected people (United Nations Economic and Social 
Council 2008: 6). 
2008 Sichuan Earthquake: Emerging Challenges from 
Citizen Activism and Intra-elite Tensions
Despite the effective rescue and reconstruction work in the aftermath of 
the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, growing civic activism and supervision 
facilitated by online media as well as intra-regime tensions emerged 
during the rescue and reconstruction process, which posed substantial 
challenges to China's disaster management systems.
First, the Party-state's non-participatory approach was questioned 
by the rising civic activism associated with the use of the Internet and 
burgeoning social media. This was unprecedented. For the ﬁrst time, 
the Internet proved to be a crucial channel of information in China's 
disaster relief work. It served at least three important functions in the 
wake of the earthquake: information, expressionand civic mobilization 
(Yang 2008: 5). As a consequence of more than a decade of civil society 
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development in China, citizens responded to the disaster just as quickly 
as the government, with the Internet being an uncensored channel of 
information and communication among civic forces. For citizens, the 
Internet was the most important channel of information during the 
earthquake, followed closely by television (Table 1). Internet-mobilized 
civic actions posed a threat to the overwhelming role played by the state 
in disaster management. Government-organized non-governmental 
organizations (GONGOs) like the Red Cross Society of China and China 
Charity Federation, which had monopolized the receipt of donations 
in disasters, faced competition from online fund-raising organized by 
major web sites and pure non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
such as martial arts star Jet Li's One Foundation. In the ﬁrst 24 hours 
after the quake, individual volunteers rushed to the quake-hit regions 
in Sichuan Province, driving their own vehicles and using their own 
rescue tools. Environmental and educational NGOs in Beijing initiated 
a 'Green Ribbon' campaign, in which their members and volunteers 
fanned out in the streets in fund-raising and blood drives.
TABLE 1: Main Channels of Information after the Sichuan Earthquake 
in 2008 (n=523)  
Information Channel %
Internet 36
Television 34
Newspaper 20
Cellular phone 5
Radio 4
Magazine 1
Source: Yang 2008: 4
Second, despite the government's strict control and restrictions over 
NGOs and the media, its management of natural disasters encountered 
increasing oversight and criticism from society. Such investigative ac-
tions initiated by individuals against disaster-related graft ﬁrst focused 
on shoddy public buildings that had killed thousands of students during 
the quake. The non-repressive disaster management sector appeared to 
be repressive under the condition that civic activities posed a serious 
threat to the CCP's core interest in maintaining its legitimacy and posi-
tive image among the public. Civil right activists including Ai Weiwei, 
Tan Zuoren and dozens of volunteers participated in the investigation 
into the poor construction of the schools and posted the evidence they 
had collected on their online blogs. Their claims conﬂicted with the of-
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ﬁcial stand that no students were killed by substandard school building-
sand subsequently both Tan and Ai were arrested. Nevertheless, public 
concern over corruption continued during the reconstruction period 
when more reports were released about the misuse and embezzlement 
of donation funds and materials. A Sichuan secondary school rebuilt 
in 2010 with HK$2 million in quake relief funds was later torn down to 
make way for a luxury housing development.10 With the quick spread 
of social media, the government has appeared more vulnerable when 
trying to fend off accusations supported by evidence.    
Third, China's centralized way of handling the earthquake in 2008 
revealed its weakness in coordination and cooperation among differ-
ent institutional actors. Overloaded with excessive responsibilities 
in disaster management, the central government has to take care of 
almost all trivial details related to organizing donations, sending re-
ports to the disaster zones, transporting aid materials and dispersing 
compensation funds. This increases the difﬁculty in coordinating work 
among various sectors and in implementing detailed instructions and 
policies; on many occasions this causes inefﬁciency and even corrup-
tion. Premier Wen Jiabao, head of the Earthquake Relief Headquarters 
of the State Council, had to bark orders to army generals over whom 
Wen had no power when he learned that rescuers from the People's 
Liberation Army had yet to reach Wenchuan, a city of 100,000 at the 
quake's epicentre.11 Local governments at various levels did not follow 
their superiors' instructions when allocating relief and recovery funds. 
Meanwhile, the central and local governments often have different 
perceptions of the importance of disaster management. Obsessed with 
high-speed economic growth, which has become a major indicator to 
measure the performance of administrative chiefs, local governments 
at various levels pay much more attention to glamorous industrial and 
urban projects instead of disaster preparation and relief projects. Due 
to insufﬁcient funding from local budgets, some remote seismological 
observatories and disaster reduction facilities cannot be maintained.12 
The earthquake in 2008and ﬂoods and mudslides in 2010 can be consid-
ered timely wake-up calls for the government on the need to pay more 
attention to the development of local disaster reduction infrastructure 
that has lagged behind the expansion of urban areas and urban popu-
lation growth.    
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Reinstitutionalization after 2008
Having drawn lessons from relief work in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, 
the Chinese leadership reinstituted the holistic disaster management sys-
tem by formulating the National Emergency Response Plan for Natural 
Disaster Relief,13 which gave detailed operating guidelines for the divi-
sion of work among various institutional actors based on the severity 
of disasters. In addition to this new plan, applicable to relief actions for 
all kinds of natural disasters, thematic disaster response systems includ-
ing ad hoc response plans targeting speciﬁc types of disasters were also 
regularized to improve administrative efﬁciency and avoid central–local 
and administrative–military inconsonance. Nevertheless, more pressing 
issues linked to rising citizen activism in disaster relief, online oversight 
and social media's role in information sharing were overlooked in the 
reinstitution process. To a large extent, the reform since 2008, with limited 
technical and administrative improvement, has reinforced the authori-
tarian regime's non-participatory style in disaster management, a trend 
contrary to the growing civic demand for more participation in public 
affairs amidst the new Internet and social media culture.
The Sichuan earthquake in 2008 catalyzed the enactment of the Na-
tional Emergency Response Plan for Natural Disaster Relief in October 
2011. Previously, the government's disaster response plan was only 
included as part of the National Master Plan for Responding to Public 
Emergencies, in which most of the guidelines were generalized for all 
public emergency events, not speciﬁcally designed for disaster manage-
ment. For a long time China had no speciﬁc emergency response plan 
to deal with certain types of natural disasters, nor did China classify the 
disasters according to their severity, controllability or affected areas. In 
the new framework of the National Emergency Response Plan for Natu-
ral Disaster Relief, the Chinese government classiﬁed natural disasters 
into four response categories, based on the severity and controllability 
of disasters.14 Level I is for the most severe situation, where at least 200 
people are killed (or over one million people need emergency aid in the 
disaster). The response is organized directly by the vice-premier-level 
director of the National Disaster Reduction Commission in the central 
government, together with the affected provincial and local govern-
ments. Level II is for very severe disasters with a death toll between 
100 and 200, where the minister of civil affairs (also the deputy director 
of the National Disaster Reduction Commission) should organize and 
coordinate disaster relief work. Level III is for severe disasters with 
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adeath toll between 50 and 100, where the vice-ministerial-level secre-
tary-general of the National Disaster Reduction Commission should take 
charge of the coordination work. Level IV is for general disasters with a 
death toll below 50, where the Ofﬁce of the National Disaster Reduction 
Commission should organize and coordinate relief work. 
Through the classiﬁcation of natural disasters based on severity, the 
central government has found it easier to ﬁgure out the amount of funds 
that should be allocated to different disasters as well as which level of 
government ofﬁcials should play a pivotal role in disaster relief work. 
In addition, the National Emergency Response Plan for Natural Disaster 
Relief has reinforced the leading role of the government, especially the 
central government, in disaster relief work. The plan replaced the tra-
ditional principle of 'combination of central and regional system while 
giving priority to the regional system' (tiaokuaijiehe yikuaiweizhu) with 
the new norm of 'singular leadership at the central level' (tongyi lingdao) 
and 'government dominance in relief work' (zhengfu zhudao). After the 
Tax Sharing Reform in 1994, which greatly enhanced the ﬁscal capac-
ity of local governments at various levels, regional governments have 
simultaneously increased their power in disaster relief work. At the same 
time, the reinstitution again consolidated the role of the central govern-
ment in the fragmented disaster management system. Premier Wen's 
plight vis-à-vis the military in the 2008 earthquake should be averted 
under the new system where the PLA, as an institutional member of 
the National Disaster Reduction Commission, has to obey orders from 
the unitary leadership of the Commission.     
Besides the National Emergency Response Plan for Natural Disaster 
Relief that is applicable to all kinds of natural disasters, ad hoc response 
plans have been put into place to handle speciﬁc types of disasters. These 
include the National Emergency Response Plan for Flood and Drought 
Disasters, National Emergency Response Plan for Earthquake Disasters, 
National Emergency Response Plan for Geological Disasters and National 
Emergency Response Plan for Very Severe and Most Severe Forest Fire 
Disasters. Horizontally, the central government has set up various in-
teragency mechanisms to ensure the clear-cut division of work among 
involved ministries and departments. For routine jobs on disaster relief, 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs plays the pivotal role in coordinating the 
work of different sectors. In catastrophic disasters like the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake or the 2010 Yangtze River ﬂoods, ad hoc interagency panels 
such as the Earthquake Relief Headquarters and the State Flood Control 
and Drought Relief Headquarters command the disaster relief campaigns. 
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According to relevant legal documents, all the involved departments and 
sectors have been assigned well-deﬁned jobs in the colossal bureaucratic 
system on disaster management to avoid administrative chaos, with 
punishment in place for the breach of duty.    
The Chinese government set up the Earthquake Relief Headquarters 
of the State Council (guowuyuan kangzhenjiuzai zongzhihuibu) in response 
to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. The deadly 8.0-magnitude quake hit 
southwest Sichuan Province on 12 May. On 18 May 2008, the State 
Council publicized the details of the Earthquake Relief Headquarters, 
which was divided into nine interagency work groups to coordinate the 
work among various sectors.15 A ministry or department was appointed 
to play a pivotal role in each group: the General Staff Department of the 
Chinese army coordinated the emergency response group, the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs coordinated the disaster relief group, the China Earth-
quake Administration coordinated the earthquake monitoring group 
and the Ministry of Health was the coordinator in the public health and 
anti-epidemic group.
The Earthquake Relief Headquarters of the State Council was speciﬁ-
cally set up to deal with the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, but such ad hoc 
mechanisms continue to exist long after the occurrence of the quake. 
This is mainly because the reconstruction and recovery process takes a 
long time in the province and the central government has realized the 
importance of maintaining the mechanism to respond to severe earth-
quakes that may strike China again in the future. When Yushu, in north-
western China's Qinghai Province, was hit by a devastating magnitude 
6.9 earthquake in April 2010, the Earthquake Relief Headquarters of the 
State Council immediately organized emergency aid and disaster relief 
work at the national level. 
Both the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters and 
the Earthquake Relief Headquarters are ad hoc interagency mechanisms 
under the State Council, but there is a structural distinction between 
them. The Earthquake Relief Headquarters is a multi-layer organiza-
tion comprised of various work groups, each of which is headed by 
a certain ministry or department, while the State Flood Control and 
Drought Relief Headquarters has no such subgroups and is simply a 
two-layer organization in which the Ministry of Water Resources plays 
a pivotal role. 
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Second Sichuan Earthquake in a Social Media Era:  
The Limits to the Reinstitution 
China's reinstitution of the disaster management system since 2008 
proved to be effective in mobilizing the top-down bureaucracy to cope 
with the second Sichuan earthquake, in Lushan County, Ya'an in April 
2013. The political authority of the newly anointed premier Li Keqiang, 
as well as his State Council colleagues sitting on the National Disaster 
Reduction Commission, was undeniably respected by both the military 
and local governments. Technically speaking, the leadership was more 
efﬁcient than ﬁve years earlier in coordinating various intra-bureaucracy 
players to achieve a better division of work, relying more on the institu-
tionalized procedures set by the National Emergency Response Plan for 
Natural Disaster Relief. Based on the rough death toll ﬁgure (less than 
100) provided by the local government, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
originally only launched a level III response for rescue and relief work, 
which ﬁt strictly in the categorization of disasters written into the Na-
tional Emergency Response Plan for Natural Disaster Relief. The central 
authority later raised the response level to the highest level (level I) only 
when the death toll rose to above 200, which also triggered the involve-
ment of higher-ranking ofﬁcials. The government-dominated relief work 
was logistically efﬁcient, since helicopters reached the disaster site within 
hours, while workers dynamited their way through roads blocked by 
landslides, making the quake zone accessible by road eight hours later, a 
marked improvement from more than three days taken during the 2008 
quake. Infrastructure was restored more expediently, with electricity and 
communications networks up and running the next day.  
On the other hand, the reinforcement of the authoritarian regime's 
non-participatory style in disaster management since 2008 further con-
tradicted the growing civic demand for more participation in public 
affairs amidst the new social media culture. In the self-reinforced, state-
centric disaster management system, the reform failed to address the 
urgent civic demand for substantial participation and supervision, with 
the increasingly salient inﬂuence of the Internet and social media being 
overlooked by the institutional designers. Such neglect subsequently 
had an unanticipated negative impact on the credibility of the govern-
ment-dominated disaster management system in the second Sichuan 
earthquake, in 2013. 
The ﬁrst day after the earthquake, the government-organized Red 
Cross Society of China encountered an unprecedented credibility crisis 
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in People's Republic of China's history when it received a mere 140,000 
yuan (US$ 22,700) in donations, compared to 10 million yuan taken in 
by Jet Li's One Foundation.16 The public image of China's Red Cross had 
been severely damaged in 2011 by a scandal revealed online where a 
woman known as Guo Meimei, who may have traded on a presumed 
connection through a company called Red Cross Commerce, bragged 
of her luxurious lifestyle, posting photos of expensive cars and luxury 
accessories on Sina Weibo, China's most popular Twitter-like microb-
log service. Meanwhile, it was widely circulated on social media, with 
evidence provided by reporters and whistle-blowers, that following 
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, billions of yuan in donations managed 
by China's Red Cross had gone missing. 
The substantial loss of donations absorbed by government-linked 
organizations between the two Sichuan earthquakes reﬂects the gov-
ernment's inability to maintain its credibility, which has been severely 
challenged in the social media era. Rising civic demand for more par-
ticipation in the rescue and relief was still suppressed by the regime in 
the 2013 Sichuan earthquake, although ordinary people had been engag-
ing in a broad range of political action and ﬁnding a new sense of self, 
community and empowerment in the those ﬁve years. The reinstitution 
within the authoritarian regime has improved the hardware aspects of 
disaster management, but ignored the most salient civil society dynamics 
driven by cyberspace activism and civic consciousness that may pose 
lethal challenges to the authoritarian regime itself. 
Conclusion
In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, non-repres-
sive institutional pillars such as the disaster management system in a 
non-democratic government are often neglected. Through the research 
on China's two rounds of reinstitutionalization in the reform period 
in the realm of natural disaster management, the article attempts to 
make contributions to new institutionalist studies of authoritarianism 
to help explain the CCP's 'authoritarian resilience'. Based on analysis of 
the evolution of China's thematic disaster response plans and disaster 
management mechanisms in the reform period, the article has discussed 
different fundamental challenges the authoritarian institutional design-
ers needed to address before and after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in 
disaster managementand to what extent the institutionalization or re-
institutionalization has been effective in addressing these challenges. 
_________________________________________________________________________45
________________ Institutionalization in the Politics of China's Disaster Management
In the ﬁrst three decades of the reform era, the CCP gradually normal-
ized the bureaucratic system in charge of natural disaster management 
once disrupted by the anarchical Cultural Revolution. The Party-state's 
normalization and institutionalization of the bureaucratic system over-
seeing natural disaster management have profound political implica-
tions in coordinating intractable central–local relations and improving 
the regime's international image and legitimacy. The system now has 
a clear-cut division of responsibilities among various departments, 
recognizes well-established international norms such as openness to 
foreign aidand prioritizes pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness as 
well as equipment of high-tech surveillance and logistical systems. As a 
result of the re-establishment of the disaster management bureaucracy 
the government has managed to keep the casualties caused by natu-
ral disasters relatively low. Targeting problems revealed in the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake, the Chinese leadership reinstituted the holistic 
disaster management system by formulating the National Emergency 
Response Plan for Natural Disaster Relief that detailed the division of 
responsibilities among various institutional actors based on the severity 
of disasters. Nevertheless, more pressing issues linked to rising citizen 
activism in disaster relief, online oversight and social media's role in 
information sharing have been overlooked in the reinstitution process. 
The resilient Party-state system has ostensibly showed leniency towards 
growing civic participation in disaster management and recovery, giv-
ing societal forces more room to manoeuvre in the new institutions, 
but whenever civic activities posed a threat to the CCP's core interest 
in maintaining its legitimacy and image among the public, the non-
repressive disaster management sector appeared to be repressive and 
intolerant. To a great extent, the reform since 2008, with technical and 
administrative improvement, has reinforced the authoritarian regime's 
non-participatory style in disaster management, a trend contrary to the 
growing civic demand for more participation in public affairs amidst 
the new Internet and social media culture.
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NOTES
1 The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their insightful 
comments but assumes the sole responsibility for any possible errors in the paper. 
2 The term 'authoritarian resilience' was ﬁrst used by Nathan (2003) to describe the 
CCP regime's resilience after the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, contrary to popular belief 
among many China specialists and democracy theorists that the CCP rule would 
soon fall to democratization's 'third wave'. To explain such resilience, Nathan focused 
on four aspects of the CCP regime's institutionalization: 1) the increasingly norm-
bound nature of its succession politics; 2) the increase in meritocratic as opposed to 
factional considerations in the promotion of political elites; 3) the differentiation and 
functional specialization of institutions within the regime; and 4) the establishment 
of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legiti-
macy among the public. Through the study of institutional and capacity building in 
the area of disaster management, this article aims to enhance understanding of the 
abovementioned third and fourth aspects with discussion on how the authoritarian 
regime has been capable of dealing with natural disasters and where the institutional 
constraints exist.  
3  The focus of the research has been narrowed down to natural disaster manage-
ment, instead of disaster management in a broader sense, which includes all types 
of disasters such as industrial accidents, pollution incidents and terrorist attacks.  
4  State Council General Ofﬁce, 1998, 'Circular on the departments established inside 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and related established posts' (guowuyuan bangongting 
guanyu yinfa minzhengbu zhinengpeizhi neishejigou he renyuanbianzhi guiding de tongzhi). 
Available at: http://law.lawtime.cn/d466727471821.html.
5  Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), 2010, 'Information on Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion of the Member Countries-China'. Available at: http://www.adrc.asia/nationin-
formation.php?NationCode=156&Lang=en&NationNum=22 (accessed 1 November 
2010).
6  Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010, 'Function of the Disaster-Relief Bureau of the PRC 
Ministry of Civil Affairs', http://jzs.mca.gov.cn/article/jgzn/ (accessed 2 November 
2010).
7  The New York Times, 13 September 2005, 'China's State Secrets Agency Will Guard 
One Less: Death Tolls'. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/inter-
national/asia/13china.html (accessed 2 January 2014).
8  PRC Law on National Defence 1997: Article 58.
9  Xinhua News, 3 February 2008, '306,000 troops mobilized to combat snow disasters'.
10  The Independent, 24 April 2013, 'Sichuan earthquake: Hong Kong urges aid veto over 
corruption fears'. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
asia/sichuan-earthquake-hong-kong-urges-aid-veto-over-corruption-fears-8586856.
html.
11 The New York Times, 21 May 2008, 'In Quake, Apotheosis of Premier 'Grandpa''. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/world/asia/21wen. html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 5 January 2014).
12  Jinan Times, 21 April 2013, 'Criticism over little spending on seismological forecast' 
(dizhen yuce jingfei pianshao zaogoubing). Available at: http://news.ifeng.com/main-
land/special/lushandizhen/content-3/detail_2013_04/21/24456920_0.shtml?_
from_ralated (accessed 3 January 2014).
13  State Council, 2011, 'National Emergency Response Plan for Natural Disaster Relief' 
(guojia ziran zaihai jiuzhu yingji yu'an). Available at:  http://www.gov.cn/yjgl/2011-
11/01/content_1983551.htm.
14  State Council, 2011, 'National Emergency Response Plan for Natural Disaster Relief' 
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(guojia ziran zaihai jiuzhu yingji yu'an). Available at:  http://www.gov.cn/yjgl/2011-
11/01/content_1983551.htm.
15  State Council, 18 May 2008, 'Circular on the Component Workgroups of the State 
Council Earthquake Relief Headquarters' (guanyu guowuyuan kangzhenjiuzai zong-
zhihuibu gongzuozu zucheng de tongzhi).
16  The Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2013, 'China's Red Cross Tries to Rebuild After Self-
Inﬂicted Disaster'. Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/04/30/
chinas-red-cross-tries-to-rebuild-after-self-inﬂicted-disaster (accessed 7 January 
2014).  
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